We describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice: the "date/delay effect:" Future outcomes are discounted more when time is referred to as a delay (e.g., 'in 6 months') than as a calendar date (e.g. on October 17 th ). The effect is demonstrated in four experiments, using both choice and matching response modes. Moreover, hyperbolic discounting is found only when time is referred to as a delay (discount rates are constant when time is referred to in terms of calendar dates). We conclude by suggesting that Rubinstein's (2003) 'similarity' hypothesis as a potential explanation, and then consider some of its practical implications.
Four Score and Seven Years from now: The "Date/Delay Effect" in temporal discounting
Lincoln began his Gettysburg Address with a memorable and powerful phrase: "Fourscore and seven years ago." His decision to refer in this way to the time since the founding of a Nation was the product of careful deliberation. He would not have been as happy with "About 90 years ago," or "In 1776."
In a more mundane context, researchers investigating intertemporal choices must also decide how to describe time to their respondents. They can refer to a temporal interval using units of delay (e.g., days, weeks, months, or years), combinations of these units (e.g., 'one year and six months'), or calendar dates (On July 5 th , 2006). Unlike Lincoln, however, these researchers have not considered how their chosen temporal description will affect the results they obtain. Yet there is abundant evidence, in other domains of judgment and choice, that the way options are described has a profound effect on preferences. For example, identical outcomes lead to risk seeking when they are described as losses relative to an arbitrary reference point, and risk aversion when they are described as gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983) ; the decision weight put on unitary quantities (such as probability and time) increase when they are decomposed into formally-identical subsidiary components (Read, 2001; Starmer & Sugden, 1993) ; and choices between gambles can even be influenced by whether the outcomes are listed in columns or rows (Harless, 1992) . The finding of description effects across so many domains, suggests they might occur in intertemporal choice as well.
In this paper, we focus explicitly on the effects of describing time using calendar dates or units of delay. We were prompted by the following passage from Robert Strotz's (1955) seminal paper on intertemporal choice (which we put to a use rather different from that intended by Strotz himself):
The relative weight which a person may assign to the satisfaction of a future act of consumption (the manner of discounting) may depend on either or both of two things: (1) This passage alerts us to two ways of referring to moment at which outcomes will occur: as delays or calendar dates, each corresponding to different ways of conceptualising that future moment and the interval that precedes it. The concluding sentence in the passage above also suggests that the value we place on future outcomes will depend on which conceptualisation is cued. Strotz goes further by speculating about the direction of this effect:
… To the extent that time-distance is important, I may assign a different (and probably higher) weight to September 26 as it draws nigh; if only the calendar date is important, the weight will not change as that date approaches. (p. 168).
In other words, we will discount the future less if we conceptualise time in date terms, than if we conceptualise it in delay terms 1 .
Strotz's explicit purpose when writing the passage above was to summarise a general model of time discounting. Somewhat more formally, the model is as follows:
That is, value of an outcome x i that will be received at time t i is the value it would have if received immediately (the undiscounted value,
) that reduces the value of the outcome as a function of the time before it occurs.
In the above passage, the present value of Strotz's future champagne consumption is determined by its undiscounted future value which may be affected by particulars of the date (e.g. 'the fact that it is my birthday') and the discount function (i.e., 'the fact that that date is a certain length of time away from the present.') Our interpretation of Strotz's passage suggests that if he had focused his attention entirely on his birthday (the calendar date) then ) ( i t ∆ would have been 1, and there would be no discounting, whereas if he had focused all The Date/Delay Effect Page 5
his attention on the delay, ) ( i t ∆ would be less than 1. The date/delay hypothesis is that when options are described in terms of dates rather than delays, people will put less decision weight on the 'length of time away from the present', with the consequence that people will appear more patient. If people are choosing between options, date descriptions will make them more likely to choose the larger-later over the smaller-sooner one.
In this paper, we describe four experiments testing the date/delay hypothesis. In Experiment 1, we show that people are more likely to choose the larger-later reward when time is referred to as a date than when it is referred to as a delay; In Experiment 2, this is replicated using a matching procedure; and in Experiment 3 we investigate what happens when both dates and delays are simultaneously available. Experiment 4 shows another difference between date and delay references: hyperbolic discounting occurs only when time is referred to as a delay. We postpone our theoretical discussion to the conclusion.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, participants chose between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) options. Outcome timing was referred to using either calendar dates or units of delay.
There were three temporal-reference condit ions, summarised in 
Method
Ninety students from the London School of Economics were approached in the library and courtyard, randomly assigned to one of the three conditions described above and asked to check the box of the option they preferred in four questions of the following type: Your choice: r r
Half answered the four questions in the order given in Table 1 , and half answered them in the reverse order.
Analysis
Consistent with our hypothesis, LL was chosen more often by those in the Date condition than in either the Month or Week conditions (See Table 2 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, preferences were elicited using choice. Choice is usually considered the best method for studying preference because it demands the least of the respondent.
Another widely used experimental method is matching, where the respondent provides a missing attribute value that will make two options subjectively equivalent, as in the following:
• $370 in 17 weeks is equal to $450 in ___ weeks (matching on t LL ).
• $370 in ___weeks is equal to $450 in 56 weeks (matching on t SS ).
• $370 in 17 weeks is equal to $____ in 56 weeks (matching on x LL )
• $____ in 17 weeks is equal to $450 in 56 weeks (matching on x SS ).
Where t LL is the time at which the larger-later outcome (x LL ) will be received, and t SS is the time when the smaller-sooner outcome (x SS ) will be received. Matching tasks are theoretically important because they correspond to such real-world activities as pricing, bidding and negotiating.
Research has shown that choice and matching draw on different psychological processes, and consequently that trade-off rates can differ dramatically between them (e.g., Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988; Frederick & Shafir, 2004) . When matching, respondents may often apply mathematical operations on the numeric attribute values that are sensitive to irrelevant features such as whether the attribute values are exact multiples of one another, and insensitive to relevant features such as whether the numbers refer to hours or minutes of labour (Frederick & Shafir, 2004) . Thus, we could not assume from the choice results in Experiment 1, that the date/delay effect would occur in matching.
Method
Participants included professionals and students from the London School of ) was missing. For half of the participants, time was referred to as a calendar date, and for half it was referred to as a delay in months. The instructions were as follows: "Imagine that you will receive some one off payments, which are guaranteed and that you can choose how much you will receive and when." Respondents were then shown an example question like the one below: Table 3 .
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Analysis
For each question, a standardized value of the discount function, called a discount factor, was obtained using the following formula:
Where time is measured in units of one year. We use δ(x LL ) to denote values obtained when the larger-later amount was left blank, and so on.
The mean values of δ, collapsed across all questions, are depicted in Figure 1 . We analysed the data by means of four 2×2×2 ANOVAs, one for each question, and the results of these analyses are given in Table 4 . We focus our discussion on the major results: The main effect of Temporal reference (date versus delay), the main effect of the Timing of the missing value (whether the subjects were asked to specify an attribute of the more immediate or more delayed reward), and the interaction between Timing and Attribute (whether respondents were matching on time or amount). Figure 1 shows a strong date/delay effect. For every matching condition, δ was higher (that is, there was less discounting) when time was referred to as a calendar date than when it was referred to as a delay. This was confirmed by the ANOVA, which confirmed a strong main effect of temporal reference for every condition.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Additional results
For all conditions there was a main effect of timing and an interaction between attribute and timing. The main effect, as can be seen in Figure 1 , reflects the fact that δ was lower when matching on time, and the interaction indicates that this effect was entirely due to the very low values of δ(t LL ). We suggest this pattern reflects an anchoring effect. Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic (1988) and Delquie (1997) have each suggested that respondents may often generate the requested matching response for the missing attribute by starting with, and then adjusting, the attribute value of the fully specified option (against which the partially specified "matching" option is being compared and, ostensibly, equated). In our stimuli, for example, a respondent asked to provide x SS may start with x LL , and adjust that downward. To the extent that the final response is "anchored on" or assimilated with the starting value, the adjustment will be "insufficient" in the sense that an attribute will receive more weight when it is the matching dimension than when it is the fully specified dimension (see Delquie, 1997) . For our stimuli, this would increase δ when matching on amount (by decreasing the difference between two amounts) and decrease δ when matching on time (by decreasing the difference The Date/Delay Effect Page 10 between two times). This can account for the main effect of attribute. It does not, however, explain the the interaction (why the imputed δ was lower when specifying the time of the later larger reward than when specifying the time of the smaller sooner reward. One explanation, is that when matching on t LL the standard anchoring story applies -people give a time close to t SS , thus decreasing δ( t LL ) --but that when matching on t SS they anchor on the present t 0 rather than on t LL . This will increase the interval between the outcomes, thereby increasing δ and producing the pattern observed in this study.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the date/delay effect, and showed that whatever distinguishes dates and delays is found in both matching and choice. We now investigate what happens when both the date and delay perspectives are made salient.
Method
Participants were 90 students from the LSE who were approached in the library and courtyard and asked to complete our questionnaire.
The method was similar to that of Experiment 1. Participants chose between pairs of outcomes where the times were referred to as either Delays in months, Dates, or as Datesplus-Delays, as shown below:
Option 1 Option 2
You receive: £900 £1200
When:
In 4 months The specific questions used in the experiment are summarised in Table 5 . those people who showed such large date/delay effects in these experiments would have, both frequently and recently, been exposed to both types of descriptions.
Experiment 4
Hyperbolic discounting is the hypothesized tendency for the discount factor δ to increase the farther in the future an outcome is expected to occur (Ainslie, 1975; Strotz, 1955 (Pender, 1996; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003 Experiment 2) . This pattern of findings suggests there may be a regularity, in which hyperbolic discounting occurs only (or, at least, primarily) when time is referred to using delays. This hypothesis is tested in Experiment 4.
Method
In this experiment, discounting was measured using a choice titration method, as described in Read (2001) . Participants chose between delayed options and, after each choice, either x LL or x SS was adjusted until an indifference point was reached.
Participants were divided into four groups based on whether time was described as a Date or Delay, and on whether the discounting period was Long or Short. The stimuli are summarised in Table 6 . The periods were divided into 4 intervals that spanned the interval from t i to t i+1 . For example, in the Short condition the first interval spanned the dates from 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Results
The mean values of δ are depicted in Figure 2 . As can be seen, δ was always higher when time is referred to as a date than as a delay. Confirming this, there was a significant main effect of time reference, F(1,55) = 5.6, p<.02. There was also a main effect of interval, indicating that, consistent with the predictions of hyperbolic discounting, δ increased for later interval onsets, F(3,165)=8.1, p<.000. However, as can be seen in Figure 3 , this increase was entirely due to the Delay condition, an observation that is supported by the highly significant 
Discussion
In these studies, we showed the 'date/delay' effect: time is treated differently when it is referred to as a specific calendar date than when referred to in terms of delay. Specifically, the date description results in less discounting, and also reveals no evidence of the hyperbolic discounting often found in studies using delay descriptions. We will discuss these results in three parts: First, we discuss a theoretical explanation for these findings, and offer some hypotheses for further research; Next, we consider some practical implications of our results;
Finally, we draw some lessons from them concerning how we do research.
Theoretical
Our studies were primarily designed to test the date/delay hypothesis, not to give a definitive account of why it occurs. However, some guidance can be found in recent articles suggesting that observed discounting behaviour is not determined by an underlying discount function, but rather by similarity comparisons between options on the dimensions of time and amount. Specifically, Leland (2002 ) and Rubinste in (2000 , 2003 propose that discounting over an interval is determined by the similarity of the time-points marking its beginning and its end: the more similar, the less discounting. Both authors stress the implications of their hypothesis for hyperbolic discounting. Rubinstein argues that hyperbolic discounting occurs because the similarity between two time-points separated by a common interval increases with the onset of that interval: 12 months is more similar to 11 months than 2 months is to 1 month. The per-unit discount factor (δ), therefore, increases with interval onset. This account easily fits the findings for the delay conditions of Experiment 4. If we extend the similarity analysis to non-quantitative comparisons (implied, but not explicit ly discussed, by Rubinstein and Leland) it also fits the findings for the date conditions. We suggest the similarity between dates separated by a common interval does not change the later they occur. That is, the 
Implications
The date/delay effect has important practical implications. One lesson is that commercial retailers should refer to temporal outcomes in terms of calendar dates when they want their clients to discount future outcomes very little (e.g. if the buyer must incur unavoidable long shipping delays) and in terms of delays when they want to encourage discounting (e.g. when the seller makes money from express shippin g). These implications may be greatest in the domain of investment and credit offerings. When people think of the future in terms of calendar dates, they will be more likely to invest and less likely to borrow, because there will be less discounting over the interval between the present and the moment when future returns will be received, or future payments must be made. For instance, when offering Bonds, Euro Bills Treasury Bills, and other fixed term securities, it would be better to emphasize the specific listed calendar date on which they mature, as this should reduce discounting and increase willingness to invest at a given rate. Conversely, it may be best to offer loans by referring to the delay until the loan comes due as this should make future payments seem more distant, and therefore less onerous. In fact, this is how Bonds and loans are advertised, although we doubt this is a strategic decision 4 . Another implication is that 'buy now, pay later…' schemes should be more attractive when described in delay terms ('pay nothing for 6 months.') than when described using specific dates ('pay nothing until June 2004'). An informal survey of retailers in the UK making such offers found that the vast majority do, in fact, describe their offerings in this way (though again we doubt that this is strategic).
of 2004 it will be worth £1500 by Christmas, 2014," than by marketing it as "If you put £1000 in a cash ISA today it will be worth £1500 in less than 11 years." Likewise, to decrease consumer's willingness to incur debt, government regulation could require merchants to specify, in calendar terms, the implications of loans, as in "… on January 28, 2004 , February 27, 2004 , and the last Friday of every month thereafter until December 29, 2008, you must pay Johnson's Electronics $100." Correspondingly, annuity products might seem more attractive when payments are described as being made on a specific date each year.
Conclusion
Politicians and poets know that the quality and intensity of our responses to acts or events is affected by how they are described. Numbers in a row with a common superscript do not differ significantly by Tukey HSD test. Numbers with a common superscript do not differ significantly by Tukey HSD test. 
